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Abstract 
Humans tend to discount information that undermines past choices and judgements. This 
confirmation bias has significant impact on domains ranging from politics to science and 
education. Little is known about the mechanisms underlying this fundamental characteristic of 
belief formation. Here, we report a novel mechanism underlying the confirmation bias. 
Specifically, we provide evidence for a failure to use the strength of others’ disconfirming 
opinions to alter confidence in judgements, but adequate use when opinions are confirmatory. 
This bias is related to reduced neural sensitivity to the strength of others’ opinions in the 
posterior medial prefrontal cortex (pMFC) when opinions are disconfirming. Our results 
demonstrate that existing judgements alter the neural representation of information strength, 
leaving the individual less likely to alter opinions in the face of disagreement.  
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People are more influenced when others express judgements with high confidence than low 
confidence1–5. All else being equal, if an eye witness is confident she observed Jim stabbing 
George, the jury would treat such testimony as strong evidence that Jim is guilty and would be 
more likely to convict Jim than if the eye witness was unsure it was Jim they observed. If a 
doctor is confident in her diagnosis, the patient is more likely to follow the recommended 
treatment. There are, however, many examples in which the strength of another’s opinion is 
dissociated from the influence it exerts. For instance, over the last decade climate scientists 
have expressed greater confidence that climate change is man-made. Yet, the percentage of 
the population that believe this notion to be true has dropped over the same period of time6. 
While there are complex, multi-layered reasons for this specific trend, such examples may be 
related to a bias in the utilization of the strength of other’s opinions.  
Humans are inclined to discount information that contradicts past judgments – a phenomenon 
known as the confirmation bias7–10. It is unknown, however, whether people’s sensitivity to the 
strength of new information is contingent on whether the information confirms or disconfirms a 
prior judgement. In other word, does it matter less whether another’s opinion is strong or weak 
when it is disconfirmatory than when it is confirmatory? If a juror judges Jim to be innocent 
would it make a difference whether the prosecutor then presents a confident witness claiming 
otherwise or a less confident one?   
Psychological theories of moral11 and political12,13 judgments suggest that people automatically 
reject information that does not fit their prior beliefs, only engaging in reasoning subsequently 
when justifying decisions to others. Recent computational models8,10 offer a similar prediction.  
Specifically, that committing to a certain view, for example by voting, might cause a reduction 
in the neural sensitivity to subsequent disconfirming evidence. If indeed the sensitivity to 
disconfirming evidence is reduced as compared to confirming evidence, it is likely that the 
strength of the evidence matters less when it is disconfirming than confirming, thus having less 
impact. 
One may also theorize, however, the opposite to be true. That is, disconfirming evidence may 
be processed with more scrutiny14,15, perhaps due to surprise. Heightened processing of 
disconfirming information has been suggested by psychological theories that assume that 
increased attention is needed in order to reject incoming information16,2. Under this theory 
people may be more sensitive to the strength of disconfirming evidence as compared to 
confirming evidence, which may allow rationalization of the evidence as untrue or irrelevant.  
Yet, a third class of models suggest that information is processed similarly regardless of 
whether it confirms or disconfirms a person’s belief, but the former is given more weight when 
making subsequent judgments (e.g., override model18,19 or value-shift model8). Override 
models, for example, suggests that people’s current beliefs do not interfere with the initial 
processing of information, but exert influence when judgments are subsequently expressed18,19. 
Such theories may predict equal sensitivity to evidence strength whether it is confirming or 
disconfirming.  
 
We hypothesized that if differential sensitivity to the strength of others’ opinions exists based 
on whether it is confirming or disconfirming, it would likely be observed in markers of neural 
activity in the posterior medial prefrontal cortex (pMFC). The pMFC, which includes the dorsal 
anterior cingulate cortex and pre-supplementary motor area, has been implicated in error 
monitoring and performance monitoring, in particular when pMFC activity is then followed by 
performance adjustments20–24. Importantly, the pMFC has been shown to track post-decision 
information25 and might signal when people should switch away from a previously chosen 
option26,27. It has been further suggested that individuals with impairments in this region may 
display cognitive inflexibility28.    
 
To test whether people differentially utilize a signal of the strength of others’ opinions when it 
contradicts or aligns with a previous judgement, we combined functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) with a behavioral task in which participants were asked to re-evaluate past 
decisions in light of the opinions of others.  
 
Evidence is commonly defined as information indicating whether a belief is true. In the current 
task the post-decision evidence offered to participants was judgements of another individual. 
People frequently form their own beliefs based on the opinions of others, such as the opinions 
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of experts, friends, family and online users29. Opinions of others are especially susceptible to 
the confirmation bias7, perhaps because they are relatively easy to dismiss as subjective. The 
signal of opinion strength provided to the participants was the wager another person put on 
their judgement, which serves as an incentive compatible proxy for confidence. We find that 
participants are less likely to utilize the strength of other’s opinions to re-asses their judgement 
when it is contradictory. This bias was related to a failure to track the strength of contradictory 
opinions in the pMFC, leaving the individual unlikely to alter their judgments in the face of 
disagreement. The findings provide a novel mechanism underlying the confirmation bias.  
 
Results 
Participants arrived in the lab in pairs and were introduced to each other before retiring to 
individual cubicles. They then each made 175 binary judgements about the likely asking price 
of properties on a well-known international real estate website (e.g., ‘is this property on the 
market for more or less than $1,000,000?’) and wagered money on their judgments (on a scale 
from 1 cent to 60 cents). Wagering provides an incentive compatible proxy for confidence in a 
judgment. Each participant was then placed in one of two fMRI scanners facing each other with 
a glass wall dividing the two scanners.  
In the scanner participants observed all stimuli again, reminded of their past judgement and 
wager, and were then presented with what they believed was the judgement of the other 
individual (post-decision information) and the wager of that individual (a proxy of opinion 
strength). On 10% of the trials the partner’s judgment and wager was masked. Participants 
then inputted their final wager. Ten trials were selected randomly at the end of the study. If the 
participants’ judgement was correct (i.e., fit the actual asking price on the market) they would 
receive the final amount they wagered as a bonus, if they were incorrect they would lose that 
amount.  Unbeknownst to the participants the judgments and wagers they observed were not 
in fact of their task partner, but decided by an algorithm such that on half the trials the partner 
appeared to agree with the participant and on half the trials to disagree (see methods for 
details).  
 
 
Figure 1. Experimental Paradigm. Pairs of participants completed a task that included two sessions. (A) 
In session one, participants were placed in individual cubicles and were presented with real estate photos 
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and prices. They were to indicate whether they believed the market price of the property on the real estate 
website was higher or lower than the one displayed. After making their judgment, they entered an amount 
between 1 cent and 60 cents to wager (invest) on their judgment. (B) Session two took place in two 
adjacent MRI scanners separated by a glass wall. On each trial participants were presented with the same 
photos and prices as in session one. They were reminded of their previous judgment and wager, followed 
by what they were led to believe was their partner’s judgment and wager. They were then asked to enter 
a final wager. On half the trials the partner’s judgment was the same as their own (i.e., confirmation) and 
on half the trials it was different (i.e., disconfirmation). The red outline is for demonstration purpose only - 
it indicates the time point of interest for fMRI analysis. 
 
A confirmation bias in re-evaluating the accuracy of past judgements in response to 
another’s opinion.   
We first examined whether participants’ responses were indicative of the classic confirmation 
bias. In accordance with the confirmation bias we found that confirmatory evidence (i.e., 
learning their partner agreed with them) had greater impact on participants’ evaluation of their 
past judgement (as measured by change in wager) than disconformity evidence (learning their 
partner disagreed with them).  
On trials when participants learned their partner agreed with them they increased their wager 
(Mchange = 7.94 cents, significantly greater than zero t(30) = 4.73, p < 0.001) and on trials their 
partner disagreed with them they decreased their wager (Mchange = 3.57 cents, significantly 
greater than zero t(30) = 2.67, p = 0.004). Importantly, the magnitude by which they altered 
their wager was significantly greater when their partner agreed with them than when they 
disagreed (F(1,29) = 5.73, p = 0.008, η2partial = .19, Figure 2A). This pattern was observed in 
the majority of participants (Figure 2B), despite the fact that participants were always 
interacting with the same partner. In all analyses we control for participants’ initial wager (see 
Methods).  
On trials when the partner’s opinion was not revealed, participants did not change their wager 
(Mchange = 0.09, not different than zero: t(30) = .07, p = 0.944) (Figure 2A). The magnitude by 
which participants changed their wager on trials when their partner disagreed with them was 
not significantly different than when no opinion was provided (F(1,29) =2.62, p = 0.116, η2partial 
= 0.08). In contrast, when their partner agreed with them they increased their wager significantly 
more than when no information was provided (F(1,29) = 26.15, p < 0.001, η2partial = .474). This 
pattern of results, which was replicated in an independent sample (Supplementry Figure), is 
consistent with a confirmation bias.   
 
Participants utilize the strength of another’s opinion when re-evaluating their judgments 
only when those opinions are confirmatory. 
Thus far we have shown that opinions that support participants’ prior judgements have greater 
impact on participants’ re-evaluation of those judgements than those that contradict them. We 
next ask whether the strength of those confirming and disconfirming opinions matter. On each 
trial participants are exposed to their partner’s wager, which provides a proxy of how confident 
their partner is on that specific trial (with high wager signalling greater confidence). The question 
is whether the partner’s wager will differentially impact the participants’ final wager on trials 
when the two agree and disagree.  
We found a positive relationship between the partner’s wager and participants’ final wager, 
when the two agreed (rpartial = 0.26, p < 0.001) but no significant relationship when the two 
disagreed (rpartial = 0.05, p = 0.17), with the former relationship greater than the latter (t(30) = 
3.88, p = 0.001, Figure 2C). This pattern, that was observed in the majority of participants 
(Figure 2D) and replicated in an independent sample (Figure S1).  
The results suggest that participants took into account the strength of another’s opinion when 
re-evaluating their own judgement, but only when the opinion was confirmatory. Note, that we 
controlled for participants’ initial wagers in this analysis (the more confident a subject was 
initially the less they updated their belief r= -0.47, p < .001). 
One possibility is that participants paid less attention to their partner’s wager when they 
disagreed with them. To test for this possibility we probed participants’ memory for their 
partner’s judgment and/or wager on 20 trials. There was no difference in the accuracy of 
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participants’ memory of the partner’s wager on trials in which the partner agreed or disagreed 
with them (t(30) = .347, p = 0.73). Thus, differential attention is an unlikely explanation. 
Moreover, there was no correlation between participants’ memory accuracy of the partner’s 
wager and the relation between participants’ final wager and partner’s wager when the partner 
agreed (rpartial =.-.47, p = 0.807) or disagreed (rpartial = -.074, p = 0.697). Participants also recalled 
their partner’s judgement better than chance (t(30) = 12.91, p < 0.001) in both conditions (agree, 
t(30) = 2.68, p = 0.012, disagree, t(30) = 2.69, p = 0.012) with no difference between the two 
conditions (t(30) = 1.09, p = 0.32). Thus, it is not the case that participants misremembered the 
partner as agreeing with them when in fact they disagreed with them. We conclude that it is 
unlikely that differential utilization of the strength of other’s opinions is due to differential 
attention or memory. Instead, we speculate that participants are more likely to disregard their 
partner’s opinion as invalid when it contradicts their own, treating fine-grained information about 
opinion strength as irrelevant.  
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Figure 2. Participants neglect the strength of disconfirming, but not confirming, opinions. (A) The 
magnitude by which participants enhanced their wager after learning their partner confirmed their 
judgment was greater than the magnitude by which they decreased their wager after learning they 
disconfirmed (displayed are signed changes). When information about the partner’s judgment was 
withheld there was no significant change in wager. (B) This pattern was observed in the majority of 
participants. (C) Participants were more likely to alter their wager in proportion to the partner’s wager 
(controlling for initial wager) when the partner agreed with their judgment compared to when they 
disagreed. (D) This pattern was observed in the majority of participants. (E) For illustration purposes, we 
depicted the relationship between the partner’s wager and participants’ final wager across all trials, 
controlling for initial wager, when the partner agreed and (F) disagreed. Behavioural data in (A & C) are 
plotted as box plots for each condition in which horizontal lines indicate median values, boxes indicate 
25–75% interquartile range and whiskers indicate 1.5x interquartile range; individual scores are shown 
separately as circles. * p < .05, ns = non-significant 
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Confirmation Bias is observed both when the partner is correct and incorrect.  
The true value of the real-estate was known to us, as stimuli were extracted from well-known 
real-estate websites. We could thus examine if the confirmation bias was observed both on 
trials when the partner was correct and incorrect. Our analysis revealed it was.  
First, absolute change in wager was greater on agree than disagree trials when partner was 
correct: (Mchange Agree = 7.5, Mchange Disagree = 3.5, F(1,29) = 7.81, p = 0.009) and 
incorrect (Mchange Agree = 8.05, Mchange Disagree = 0.5, F(1,29) = 23.5, p < 0.001).  
Second, the correlation between the partner’s wager and participant’s final wager was greater 
on agree than disagree trials when the partner was correct (rpartial agree= 0.27, rpartial 
disagree= 0.11; t(30) = 2.38, p = 0.024) and incorrect (rpartial agree= 0.23, rpartial disagree= 
0.06; t(30) = 2.71, p = 0.01).  
Controlling for partners’ accuracy (by calculating for each participant % of trials in which partner 
was accurate on agree trials minus on disagree trials, and adding this measure as a covariate) 
did not alter the confirmation bias. In particular, absolute change in participants' wager was 
greater on agree trials than disagree trials (F(1,28) = 6.74, p = .015); and correlation between 
the partner’s wager and participants’ final wager was greater on agree trials than disagree trials 
(F(1,29) = 11.17, p = 0.002). 
Participants performed slightly better than chance (M correct = 52%, p < 0.01) and thus the 
partner was less likely to be correct on disagree than agree trials (t(30) = 4.75, p < 0.001). 
Participants seemed insensitive to their partners’ accuracy. This was evident as the amount by 
which participants altered their wager was not different on trials in which their partner was 
correct (Mchange = 3.3) versus incorrect (Mchange = 3.45) (t(30) = 0.19, p = 0.844). This was 
true both for disagree trials (for trials in which the partner is correct Mchange = 3.6 and incorrect 
Mchange = 3.5, t(30) = 0.10, p = 0.91) and agree trials (correct Mchange = 7.5 and incorrect  
Mchange = 8.05, t(30) = 0.96, p = 0.35).  
Together, these analyses show that the confirmation bias is not a function of partner’s accuracy.  
 
Reduced sensitivity to the strength of disconfirmatory (vs confirmatory) opinions in 
pMFC  
Our behavioral results show that participants are more likely to incorporate the strength of 
another’s opinion when evaluating the accuracy of their own judgement when that opinion 
aligns with their own. We next turned to our fMRI data to ask whether neural tracking of other’s 
opinion strength was contingent on whether the opinion aligned or conflicted with one’s 
judgement. We focused on the pMFC, which has been shown to track post-decision 
information. In particular, to signal the extent to which an initial decision is likely to be incorrect 
given new information30.  
In our paradigm the participants learn whether their partner agrees with their judgement and 
then learn of their partner’s wager. If a partner agrees with a participant’s judgment and wagers 
the maximum amount that can be interpreted as a strong signal the participant is correct. 
However, if they agree but wager no money that is a weaker signal the participant is correct. 
Hence, one would expect a negative correlation between the partner’s wager and activity in the 
pMFC at the time the partner’s wager is observed, since the higher the partner’s wager, the 
lower the likelihood that the judgment is incorrect. If a partner disagrees with the participant’s 
judgment, however, and wagers the maximum amount, that can be interpreted as a strong 
signal the participant is incorrect. If they disagree but wager no money that is a weaker signal 
the participant is incorrect. Hence, one would expect a positive correlation between the 
partner’s wager and activity in the pMFC at the time the partner’s wager is observed since the 
higher the partner’s wager, the higher the likelihood that the judgment is incorrect.    
To test for the outlined interaction effect, we contrasted the BOLD parametric modulator 
tracking the partner’s wager on agree and disagree trials. We found a significant effect in the 
pMFC (FWE cluster level corrected, p < 0.0001 after thresholding at p < 0.0001 uncorrected, k 
= 156, BA 6 and 8, peak voxel, MNI: 10, 24, 58) (Figure 3A).  To tease apart the interaction 
effect we extracted the average betas in this cluster for each condition separately. We found 
that the interaction was characterized by a significant negative relationship between the 
 -9- 
 
partner’s wager and pMFC activity when the partner agreed with the participant (Beta = -.08, p 
< 0.001) and a non-significant positive relationship when the partner disagreed (Beta = .02, p 
= 0.19) (Figure 3B, C). The magnitude of these effects (i.e. comparing absolute betas in the 
two conditions across individuals) were significantly different from each other (t(30) = 2.37, p = 
0.02). This suggests that while the pMFC tracks the strength of another’s opinion when that 
opinion is confirmatory, it relatively fails to do so when that opinion is disconfirming.  
 
We note that participants’ own initial confidence was not tracked in the pMFC. Specifically, 
neither a model in which the participant’s initial wager was the parameter modulating activity 
during the time participants observed their own wager, nor a model in which it was modulating 
activity at the time participants observed their partner’s wager revealed effects in the pMFC 
(neither positive or negative effects on agree trials nor on disagree trials) even at a lenient 
threshold of p < 0.001 uncorrected. 
An exploratory whole brain analysis revealed a second significant cluster. This was in the 
perigenual anterior cingulate cortex (pgACC) (BA 10, peak voxel in MNI space: 6, 52,14, k = 
117, FWE cluster level corrected p < 0.0001 after thresholding at p < 0.0001 uncorrected) 
(Figure 3E). Extracting betas from this region revealed that the effect was due to BOLD signal 
tracking the partner’s wager negatively when the partner agreed with the participant (Beta = -
.07, p = 0.001), and positively when the partner disagreed (Beta = .06, p = 0.01) (Figure 3F). 
In contrast to our results in the pMFC, the magnitude of these effects were not significantly 
different from each other (t(30) = 0.27, p = 0.78), suggesting that the pgACC tracks both 
confirmatory and disconfirming information to a similar degree (in opposite directions). No 
voxels in the brain showed the inverse interaction effect.  
The pMFC selectively mediates the utilization of other’s opinion strength to alter one’s 
own when there is agreement. 
We next turn to ask whether the pMFC and/or the pgACC activity mediates the use of other’s 
confidence when re-evaluating one’s own confidence. In particular, we ask whether such a 
mediation is context specific, varying as a function of (dis)agreement. 
To that end we tested for a “moderated mediation”31 (see methods). A moderated mediation 
occurs when the effect of the independent variable (in our case the partner’s wager) on the 
dependent variable (in our case the participants’ final wager) via a mediator (in our case BOLD 
response) differs depending on a contextual factor - the moderator variable (in our case whether 
there is agreement/disagreement). In the first moderated mediation model we entered pMFC 
activity as a mediator and in a second model pgACC activity as a mediator. In order to examine 
the unique contributions of each region to behaviour, each of the moderated mediations (i.e. 
that of the pMFC and of the pgACC) were conducted while controlling for activity of the other 
region. 
The first model (Figure 3D), in which pMFC activity was the mediator, revealed a significant 
moderated mediation. In particular, pMFC activity partially mediated the relationship between 
the partner’s wager and the participant’s final wager on agree trials (β = 0.006, t(30) = 2.07, p 
= 0.046, top of Figure 3D), but not on disagree trial (β = -0.0009, t(30) = 0.51, p = 0.61, bottom 
of Figure 3D), with the former mediation effect being significantly greater than the latter (β = -
0.005, t(30) = 2.21, p = 0.035). 
Consistent with the results reported in the previous section, the model highlighted a differential 
relationship between the partner’s wager and pMFC activity on agree and disagree trials (β = 
0.014, t(30) = 2.90, p = 0.007). In particular, the significant relationship between the partner’s 
wager and pMFC activity on agree trials (β = -0.12, t(30) = 3.19, p = 0.003, top left of Figure 
3D) was greater than the non-significant relationship on disagree trials (β = 0.005, t(30) = 0.93, 
p = 0.36, bottom left of Figure 3D). In contrast, the relationship between pMFC activity and 
participants’ final wager did not differ on agree and disagree trials (β = 0.09, t(30) = 0.77, p = 
0.448). In particular, there was a significant relationship between the two on agree trials (β = -
0.26, t(30) = 2.68, p = 0.01, top right of Figure 3D) that was not significantly greater than the 
relationship on disagree trials (β = -0.19, t(30) = 1.03, p = 0.31 bottom right of Figure 3D).   
Our second model, where pgACC was entered as a mediator, did not reveal a moderated 
mediation (β = -.001, t(30) = .08, p = 0.936). The pgACC did not mediate the relationship 
between the partner’s wager and the participants’ final wager on agree trials (β = 0.00025, t(30) 
= 0.168, p = 0.868) nor on disagree trials (β = -0.000019, t(30) = 0.006,p = 0.936).   
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Together, the fMRI results suggest that utilization of the strength of confirming opinions, but not 
disconfirming opinions, was mediated by the pMFC, but not pgACC. With the pMFC tracking 
the partner’s wager more closely during agreement than disagreement. 
 
 
Figure 3. Reduced sensitivity to the strength of disconfirming (relative to confirming) opinions in 
the pMFC. A) An interaction effect in the pMFC between condition (agree/disagree) and a parametric 
modulator tracking the partner’s wager at the time it is presented (k = 156, FWE cluster level corrected p 
< 0.0001). B) Extracting mean parametric betas across voxels in this cluster revealed the interaction was 
due to a significant negative correlation between pMFC activity and the partner’s wager when the partner 
agreed with the participant and a non-significant positive correlation when they disagreed. The magnitude 
of these effects were significantly different from each other. C) For illustration purposes we display the 
mean BOLD activity across voxels in the pMFC cluster for trials in which the partner’s wager was low (0-
10), medium (20-30) and high (40- 50) separately for agree and disagree conditions. D) pMFC activity 
mediates the relationship between the partner’s wager and final wager on agree trials but not disagree 
trials. E) An interaction effect in the pgACC between condition (agree /disagree) and a parametric 
modulator tracking the partner’s wager (k = 117, FWE cluster level corrected p < 0.0001). F) Extracting 
mean parametric beta across voxels in this cluster revealed the interaction was due to a significant 
 -11- 
 
negative correlation between pgACC activity and the partner’s wager when the partner agreed with the 
participant and a significant positive correlation when they disagreed. The magnitude of these effects 
were not significantly different from each other. BOLD data in (B & F) are plotted as box plots for each 
condition in which horizontal lines indicate median values, boxes indicate 25–75% interquartile range and 
whiskers indicate 1.5x interquartile range; individual scores are shown separately as circles. * p < .05, ns 
= non-significant. 
 
Discussion 
The behavioural tendency to discount disconfirming information has significant implications for 
individuals and society as it can generate polarization and facilitate the maintenance of false 
beliefs7,32,33. Here, we characterize a novel mechanism underlying the confirmation bias. In 
particular we report a reduction in the use of the strength of others’ disconfirming opinions to 
alter judgements. We further show that this bias is associated with reduced neural sensitivity 
to the strength of others’ opinions in the pMFC.  
Participants suitably increased their wager (which is a proxy of confidence strength) when their 
partner agreed with their judgement, decreased it when the partner disagreed and did not 
change it when the partner’s opinion was unknown. Consistent with the confirmation bias, 
however, the impact of the partner’s opinion was greater when it was confirmatory than 
disconfirmatory, as evident by the fact that the magnitude of wager increase when the partner 
agreed with the participant was greater than the magnitude of wager decrease when they 
disagreed.   
Importantly, participants used the strength of their partner’s opinion (i.e. the partner’s wager) to 
re-assess the likelihood that their own judgment was correct when those opinions where 
confirmatory, but failed to do so when they were disconfirming. Utilization of the strength of 
confirming opinions, but not disconfirming opinions, was mediated by the pMFC, which tracked 
the partner’s wager more closely during agreement than disagreement. These findings suggest 
that making a judgement diminishes the use of post-decision information strength selectively 
for contradictory information. The results of our memory checks suggest that this effect was not 
due to reduced attention or memory to disconfirming opinions. Rather, we speculate that 
contradictory opinions are more likely to be considered categorically wrong and thus the 
strength of those opinions are considered unimportant.  
 
We focused specifically on a region of the frontal cortex, the pMFC, which is important for 
performance monitoring, especially in situations in which neural signal is followed by 
performance adjustments20–24 and which tracks post-decision information25. Consistent with 
past results25 we found an inverse relation between how strongly new information (in our case 
the partner’s wager) supported a past decision and pMFC activity. This significant relationship, 
however, was observed only when the partner agreed with the participant, not when they 
disagreed. Moreover, the pMFC mediated the relationship between the partner’s wager and the 
participants final wager when the two agreed, but not when they disagreed. Our whole-brain 
exploratory analysis identified another brain region that tracked the strength of other’s opinions 
– the pgACC. The pgACC has been implicated in many functions including signalling conflict, 
prediction errors and affective processes23,34–36. In contrast to the pMFC, however, the efficacy 
by which the pgACC tracked the partner’s wager did not differ as a function of agreement. 
Neither did we find that pgACC activity was mediating the influence of another’s opinion 
strength on the participant’s own on agree nor disagree trials. We thus conclude that the pMFC, 
but not pgACC, contributes to the confirmation bias in the use of the strength of others’ opinion.  
We designed a task that maximizes commitment to judgments by not allowing participants to 
alter their judgment, only the wager on it. This was due to past studies showing that confirmation 
biases are pronounced in such situations7. For example, in processing other’s opinions about 
a product after it has been purchased or about a political candidate after a vote has been made. 
It is possible that a different pattern of results would emerge when participants are not 
committed to their original judgment (i.e., when a vote can be reversed or a product returned 
with minimal effort). Indeed, in a previous study in which participants could reverse their 
judgement and were incentivized for accurately assessing their past decisions a confirmation 
bias was not observed25. In that study the evidence available was not the opinion of another, 
but rather perceptual information. The former presumably is easier to dismiss as irrelevant (i.e. 
 -12- 
 
one can easily conclude another individual is simply wrong). Because humans make the vast 
majority of decisions (including professional, personal, political and purchase decisions) based 
on information received from others, the identified bias in utilizing the strength of others’ 
opinions is likely to have a profound effect on human behaviour. 
The notion that the strength of disconfirming opinions is not necessarily proportionate to its 
impact on belief change is in accord with anecdotal and “real-world” observations in domains 
ranging from science to politics. The underlying process is remarkably flexible, with the neural 
circuitry involved switching on a trial by trials basis from high sensitivity to relative neglect, 
contingent on whether the opinion is confirmatory or disconfirming. This process may leave the 
individual less likely to alter opinions in the face of disagreement.  
 
Methods 
Participants  
Forty-two participants (male = 20, female = 22, age = 18–38; M = 29.0, SD = 7.3 years) from 
Roanoke and Blacksburg, VA, area were recruited from a large database maintained by the 
Human Neuroimaging Laboratory. The sample size was determined using the effect size 
estimates from the pilot study (see SI). Data of five participants, who failed attention checks 
during the task (see below), were excluded leaving a sample of 37. In addition, fMRI data from 
six participants were not used because of insufficient coverage of the brain. Thus, fMRI and 
behavioural analysis are conducted on data from 31 participants. Replication study was 
approved by the ethics committee at UCL. fMRI study was approved by Virgina Tech 
Institutional Review Board. 
Stimuli  
We used real estate photos and prices from a Realty website. All photos depicted the exterior 
of a real estate in North America.  
Procedure 
We invited participants to play a real estate investment game (see Figure 1). Pairs of 
participants met each other immediately before the study and were given instructions. The 
study included two sessions, each consisting of 175 trials. In the first session participants were 
placed in individual cubicles. On each trial they were presented with a real estate photo and a 
possible price for 4 seconds. The price was either 20% higher or lower than the true asking 
price on the market. The participants’ task was to decide whether the true price was higher or 
lower than the one displayed. After making their judgment, they entered an amount between 1 
cent and 60 cents to wager on their judgment. If they were correct they could receive that 
amount, if they were incorrect they could lose that amount. Investments were made from a $6 
endowment and ten trials were randomly selected at the end of the experiment for payment.  
They were told in advance that in session two, which would take place in two MRI scanners 
separated by a glass wall, they would learn what their partner’s judgment and wager was and 
their partner would learn of theirs. They will then have an opportunity to adjust their wager, but 
not their judgment. In order to ensure that participants did not hold back information or use their 
wagers strategically37, they were told that on 10% of trials they would not be able to change 
their wager. Thus, they should always wager the sum they thought was most appropriate.   
Note that using pilot data we estimated that the participants’ initial wager would be around 31c 
on average (it was 32.66 in the main study). Thus, we allowed wagering from 1c to 60c such 
that on average participants would have as much room to up their wager after agreement as 
they would to lower their wager after disagreement if they so wished. 
In the MRI scanner participants were presented on each trial again with a photo of a real estate 
and price for two seconds, followed by the presentation of their previous judgment for two 
seconds and previous wager for two seconds (Figure 1). Thereafter they were shown the 
judgment and wager of their partner for two seconds each. Finally, they had 4 seconds to enter 
their final wager.    
In reality, we manipulated the input such that the partners’ judgments confirmed that of the 
participant on half the trials (i.e., 75 trials), and contradicted it on the other half of the trials. On 
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15 trials, participants did not receive any information about either the partner’s judgment or 
wager, but instead a row of Xs was displayed. Partner’s wager was decided by a computerized 
script that drew randomly from a normal distribution with a mean that was either 10 cents higher 
or lower (SD = 5) than the participant’s initial investment on that trial.   
There were no systematic differences in participants’ initial wager on trials in which the partner 
subsequently confirmed or disconfirmed judgments (t(31) = .237, p = .814; confirmation 
condition: M = 32.28, SE = 2.21, disconfirmation condition: M = 32.18, SE = 2.22), or in the 
partner’s wager (t(31) = .254, p = .80; confirmation condition: M = 29.99, SE = 1.56, 
disconfirmation condition: M = 29.82.18, SE = 1.74). In all behavioral analyses we controlled 
for the participants’ initial wager. Hence, the results reported cannot be attributed to systematic 
differences in either initial wager or partner’s wager.   
Attention check. To ensure that participants paid attention to the judgment of their partner, we 
probed participants’ memory for the partner’s judgment and wager immediately after they 
entered their final wager. This was done on average ten times for the partner’s judgment and 
ten times for the partner’s wager. Five participants whose memory of the partner’s judgment 
was equal or lower than 50% (random guess is 50%) were excluded from all analysis. 
fMRI data analysis 
Image acquisition. The anatomical and functional imaging sessions were conducted on a 3 
tesla Siemens Magnetom Trio scanners at Carilion Research Institute. High-resolution T1- 
weighted scans (1x1x1 mm3) were acquired using an MP-RAGE sequence (Siemens, 176 
sagittal slices)). Functional images were collected using echo-planar imaging with repetition 
time (TR) = 2,000ms and echo time (TE) = 25ms, flip angle = 90°, 37 slices, and voxel size = 
3.4 × 3.4 × 4.0 mm. Functional data were first spike-corrected to reduce the impact of artifacts 
using AFNI’s 3dDespike (http://afni.nimh.nih.gov/afni). Data were subsequently preprocessed 
with SPM8 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm8/) for slice-timing correction using 
the first slice as the reference slice, motion correction, coregistration, gray/white matter 
segmentation, normalization to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template, and spatial 
smoothing using an 8mm full-width/half-maximum Gaussian kernel. Postprocessing voxels 
were 4 x 4 x 4 mm3. 
General linear model for standard fMRI analyses. Imaging analyses were conducted using 
SPM8. For each participant, the general linear model was used to model blood oxygen level-
dependent (BOLD) signals during the task, incorporating an autoregressive [AR(1)] model of 
serial correlations and a high-pass filter at 1/128 s. The following regressors were included as 
stick functions, convolved with the SPM synthetic hemodynamic response function; one onset 
of (1) display of initial judgment and wager; (2) display of partner’s judgment – separately for 
agree trials, disagree trials and no-information trials; (3) display of partner’s wager - separately 
for agree trials, disagree trials and no-information trials, with the former two modulated by (4) 
the partner’s wager; (5) display of screen prompting final wager - separately for agree and 
disagree trials; (6) attention check; and (7) fixation crosses. Six movement parameters were 
also included in the model.     
Moderated Mediation analysis.  
We set out to examine whether BOLD signal in the pMFC and/or pgACC mediates the effect of 
the partner’s wager on the participant’s final wager, and importantly whether this mediation is 
context specific (i.e., moderated). In other words, we tested if the mediation is different for agree 
and disagree conditions.  
To that end we tested for a moderated mediation. A moderated mediation occurs when the 
effect of the independent variable (in our case the partner’s wager) on the dependent variable 
(in our case final wager) via a mediator (in our case pMFC) differs depending on a contextual 
factor - the moderator variable (in our case whether there is agreement/disagreement). 
First, following previous research25,31,38,39, we extracted the trial-by-by-trial pMFC activation for 
each participant, using the pMFC cluster from the analysis displayed in Figure 3A as ROI. For 
each participant, we created a design matrix in which we modelled each presentation of the 
partner’s wager (80 per condition) as a separate event (without parametric regressors attached 
to any of these events). In addition, we included regressors for (1) the display of initial judgment 
and wager, (2) display of partner’s judgment (separately for agree trials, disagree trials and no-
information trials), (3) display of screen prompting final wager (4) attention check and (5) fixation 
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crosses. Six movement parameters were also included in the model. Events were modelled as 
delta functions and convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function to create 
regressors of interest. We then used this model to extract the BOLD signal on each trial when 
participants saw the partner’s wager averaged across voxels in our ROI using the 
'spm_summarise.m' function. BOLD signal for each presentation of the partner’s wager as 
generated by this model was then used in our moderated mediation model. We repeated the 
exact same procedure for pgACC activation (ROI from Figure 3E). 
We then created two moderated mediation models for each participant using the PROCESS 
macro for SPSS40 - one included the signal extracted from pMFC as described above and the 
other from pgACC. Because we were interested in testing for unique contributions of each 
region to behaviour, each of the moderated mediation models (i.e. that of the pMFC and of the 
pgACC) were conducted while controlling for activity of the other region. In particular, using the 
Process toolbox a moderated mediation model (model 59) was fitted for each participant that 
provided the following: 
 
1. estimates across all trials reflecting the relationship between: (i) partner's wager 
and final wager, (ii) partner's wager and ROI activity (iii) ROI activity and final wager.  
2. the same estimates as above, but separately for only agree trials and only disagree 
trials.   
3. estimates reflecting whether i, ii and iii in step 1 are each different for agree and 
disagree trials – this gives three moderation effects, each reflecting an interaction due 
to condition.  
4. a mediation effect separately for only agree trials and only disagree trials reflecting an 
indirect effect between partner’s wager and final wager via ROI activity.  
5. estimate comparing the two indirect effects described in step 4, which reflects the 
moderated mediation effect. 
 
Estimates across participants were then compared to zero using one sample t-tests. 
 
Behavioral Replication Study  
Before conducting our fMRI investigation, we piloted our experiment behaviorally. We tested 
18 participants in pairs at the University College London. Data from one participant was lost 
due to a computer crash, leaving a final sample of 17 participants. The experimental paradigm 
was similar to the one reported in the main manuscript with the following exceptions. First, the 
experiment was not split into two sessions. On each trial participants observed the real estate 
and price, entered their judgment and wager, shown what they believe to be their partner’s 
judgment and wager, and were asked to enter a final wager. Second, participants could wager 
between 1 and 99 pence. Third, participants were presented with the partner’s wager that did 
not depend on their own wager, rather they saw a series of pre-selected wagers, ranging from 
10 pence to 90 pence. Fourth, the total number of trials was only 75.       
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Supplemental Figure 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure S1. Participants relatively discount the strength of disconfirming opinions. (A) 
When the partner’s judgment confirmed the participant’s, the participant increased their wager 
by 7.46 pence on average, which was significantly greater than zero (t(16) = 3.77, p = 0.002). 
When the partner’s judgment disconfirmed the participant’s, the participant decreased their 
wager by only 2.23 pence, which was not significantly different than zero (t(16) = 1.37, p = 
0.188). The magnitude by which participants altered their wager was greater when the partner 
confirmed their judgment than when the partner disconfirmed it (t(16) = 2.44, p = 0.026). On 
trials when the partner’s judgement was not revealed, participants decreased their wager by 
0.38 cents on average, which was not different than zero (t(16) = 0.386, p = 0.705), significantly 
lower than trials on which the partner confirmed participants’ opinion (t(16) = 3.284, p = 0.005) 
but not significantly higher than trials in which the partner disconfirmed  (t(16) = 1.129, p = 0.27) 
participants’ opinion. (B) When there was agreement in judgment, the greater the partner’s 
wager the more participants would up their own wager (mean correlation between partner’s 
wager and participant’s change in wager, while controlling for participant’s initial wager, rpartial = 
0.25, p = 0.001). When the partner disagreed there was no relationship between the two (rpartial 
= 0.05, p = 0.32). The magnitude of these two relationships were significantly different (t(12) = 
2.66, p = 0.02). Behavioural data in (A & B) are plotted as box plots for each condition in which horizontal 
lines indicate median values, boxes indicate 25–75% interquartile range and whiskers indicate 1.5x 
interquartile range; individual scores are shown separately as circles. * p < .05, ns = non-significant 
 
 
 
 
